France Under Macron: Debt, Political Dysfunction, and the Crisis of Centralized Power
Hiroshi Saito, Michiyo Tanabe, and Chika Mori
Modern Tokyo Times
When Emmanuel Macron was elected president of France in 2017, political and economic elites across Europe celebrated what they regarded as a victory for the pro-European and pro-globalization consensus. Macron presented himself as a modernizing force capable of transcending the traditional left-right divide while revitalizing the French economy and strengthening France within Europe. Yet almost a decade later, the political landscape looks radically different. Economic stagnation, public dissatisfaction, immigration, social tensions, rising debt, and distrust of political elites have continued to shape French politics. Accordingly, the Macron project has encountered precisely the forces that it promised to overcome.
France’s predicament, however, extends beyond one individual. It reflects a deeper crisis of political representation and a growing contradiction between centralized executive power and the ability to generate durable parliamentary consent. The result has been political instability in a country that traditionally prides itself on a strong state and powerful institutions. Prime ministers have come and gone, governments have struggled to secure parliamentary support, and the presidency has increasingly found itself confronting the limitations of executive authority in a fragmented political environment.
The financial figures make the situation particularly stark. When Macron entered the Élysée Palace, French public debt stood at approximately 98.8% of GDP. By the end of 2025, it had reached 115.6%, before rising to 117.5% in the first quarter of 2026. At that point, France’s Maastricht public debt stood at €3.5361 trillion.
The historical comparison is revealing. France’s public debt was approximately 65.5% of GDP at the end of 2007 and 91.7% at the end of 2012 before reaching 98.8% in 2017. Under Macron, therefore, France has moved from an already heavily indebted position to a debt burden exceeding 117% of GDP. This does not mean that every euro of additional debt can be attributed personally to Macron, particularly given the extraordinary fiscal consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the trajectory during his presidency is undeniable. The debt burden is now substantially greater than when he entered office, leaving future governments with less fiscal room to respond to economic shocks while maintaining France’s extensive public commitments.
This is where the economic and political crises intersect. A government confronting a fragmented parliament has limited room to impose unpopular spending reductions or tax increases, while a heavily indebted state has less room to satisfy competing demands. France consequently finds itself caught between citizens demanding economic security and a state possessing increasingly constrained fiscal space.
The political consequences have been dramatic. Sébastien Lecornu’s resignation in 2025 became another symbol of the instability surrounding the Macron presidency. Reuters reported that Lecornu’s first tenure lasted only 27 days, while his resignation came amid the continuing struggle to establish a viable government capable of navigating France’s divided parliament and deteriorating fiscal position.
Lecornu said, “The conditions were not fulfilled for me to carry on as prime minister.” His resignation illustrated the fundamental difficulty confronting Macron: presidential authority can appoint a prime minister, but it cannot manufacture parliamentary consensus.
Lecornu’s appointment had followed the collapse of François Bayrou’s government, yet the subsequent attempt to preserve political continuity rather than produce a fundamental reset encountered opposition across the National Assembly. The result was another demonstration of the limits of governing through centralized executive authority when the legislature is deeply fragmented.
This is the central contradiction of Macronism. A presidency associated with technocratic efficiency has repeatedly encountered the limits of political consent. The revolving door of prime ministers is not simply a succession of personalities. It reflects a political system struggling to convert presidential authority into durable legislative support. Reuters described Lecornu’s resignation as part of a wider political paralysis that had already produced repeated government crises and complicated efforts to address France’s fiscal problems.
The 2024 snap parliamentary election further exposed this contradiction. Macron dissolved the National Assembly after his political camp suffered a major setback in the European Parliament election, but the subsequent legislative election produced a fragmented parliament rather than a clear governing majority. The gamble therefore did not produce the political clarification that the Élysée required. Instead, France entered another period of parliamentary instability.
This matters because political centralization has limits. A president can dissolve parliament, appoint prime ministers, and determine the broad direction of government, but a functioning Republic also requires negotiation, compromise, and sufficient parliamentary legitimacy. When executive authority becomes increasingly concentrated while legislative support becomes increasingly fragmented, political theatre can replace effective government.
The French Republic consequently faces more than a personality dispute involving Macron. It faces a structural problem concerning the relationship between presidential power, parliament, political parties, and the electorate. Changing prime ministers without addressing that underlying problem risks treating the symptom rather than the disease.
Meanwhile, Macron has continued to pursue an assertive international role. His policy toward the Russian Federation and the war in Ukraine has been particularly consequential. France has supported Ukraine and Macron has discussed the possibility of European military personnel being deployed to Ukraine as part of a future security arrangement. In May 2025, Reuters reported that France was discussing a potential troop deployment with Britain and Ukraine. Russia, meanwhile, has rejected European peacekeeping proposals and argued that such deployments could escalate the conflict.
Lee Jay Walker (Modern Tokyo Times analyst) says: “Whatever one’s position on the war, the geopolitical implications are enormous. France is simultaneously confronting substantial domestic debt, political fragmentation, economic pressures, and demands upon its armed forces while seeking a major European role in the security architecture surrounding the Russian Federation. The question is therefore not merely whether France should exercise international leadership, but how such ambitions can be reconciled with domestic fiscal and political realities.”
Macron has also sought to maintain an influential diplomatic position regarding the Middle East, including France’s decision to recognize a Palestinian state in 2025. Such diplomacy forms part of Paris’s traditional ambition to remain an independent geopolitical actor. Yet international declarations cannot substitute for domestic political stability. A state seeking influence abroad must also maintain sufficient economic strength, institutional cohesion, and public confidence at home.
The contrast is increasingly visible. France seeks to project itself as a major geopolitical power while its domestic political system struggles to produce stable governments. It seeks strategic autonomy while carrying an enormous public debt burden. It seeks to shape European security while facing intense political disagreements over taxation, pensions, immigration, public services, and the direction of the French economy.
Immigration remains one of the most contentious issues in this domestic debate. Concerns about integration, border management, public services, employment, national identity, and security have become central to French politics. Islamist terrorism has also profoundly affected French society, with major attacks during and before Macron’s presidency leaving deep scars. Yet Islamist extremism should not be conflated with Muslims generally, and immigration itself cannot be treated as a single explanation for France’s economic and social difficulties. The political challenge is to address legitimate concerns about security, integration, and state capacity without reducing complex social realities to simplistic explanations.
At the same time, the French middle and working classes continue to confront pressures surrounding living costs, housing, taxation, employment, pensions, and public services. Younger generations face their own difficulties, particularly regarding housing affordability and economic security. These pressures help explain why political dissatisfaction extends across the conventional left-right spectrum.
Lee Jay Walker says: “The rejection of the established political order is therefore not exclusively a phenomenon of the French right. Sections of the French left have also challenged globalization, austerity, economic inequality, and the concentration of political authority. The underlying divide is increasingly between competing visions of France: a more globally integrated and Europeanized Republic on one side, and a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty, economic protection, cultural continuity, and tighter immigration controls on the other. Between these positions lies a broad electorate whose priorities cannot be reduced to either ideological camp.”
Marine Le Pen of the National Rally has repeatedly demanded renewed elections as a response to the parliamentary impasse, saying, “The only wise thing to do now is to hold elections.” She also stated, “The joke’s gone on long enough. French people are fed up. Macron has put the country in an extremely difficult position.” These are political judgments from the National Rally, but they reflect a wider opposition argument that the current governing arrangement lacks sufficient legitimacy to provide stability.
The deeper issue is whether another election alone can resolve France’s problems. Electoral change can alter the distribution of political power, but it cannot automatically repair public finances, revive economic growth, rebuild public confidence, or reconcile incompatible political blocs. France therefore requires more than a change of personalities. It requires a sustainable political settlement capable of addressing the economic and institutional pressures that have accumulated over many years.
This is why Macron’s 2024 snap election remains so significant. A decision intended to clarify the political landscape instead produced greater parliamentary fragmentation. Reuters subsequently described Macron as facing severe political turmoil following the resignation of his fifth prime minister in two years. The episode demonstrated that presidential initiative cannot by itself overcome an electorate increasingly divided between competing political movements.
France now confronts a combination of problems that reinforce one another: a historically high debt burden, persistent fiscal deficits, parliamentary fragmentation, political distrust, immigration pressures, social unrest, and an ambitious foreign policy. None of these problems can be solved through rhetoric alone.
The debt figures are particularly difficult to dismiss. France did not suddenly become indebted under Macron; the accumulation began long before him. Yet the scale reached during his presidency is historically significant. From approximately 98.8% of GDP when he entered office to 117.5% in the first quarter of 2026 represents an increase of almost 19 percentage points. The pandemic explains an important part of the increase, but it does not erase the responsibility of successive governments to confront the fiscal consequences that remain.
The danger is therefore not simply debt itself. It is the interaction between debt and political paralysis. Governments that cannot command reliable parliamentary support find it more difficult to enact difficult fiscal reforms. Governments that inherit enormous debt have less freedom to respond to economic crises. And citizens facing stagnant living standards can become increasingly hostile toward political elites who appear insulated from the consequences of policies pursued in their name.
The French Republic remains far too substantial a country to be reduced to the failures or successes of one president. France possesses enormous economic resources, a powerful cultural heritage, global diplomatic reach, military capabilities, and institutions with deep historical roots. But national potential does not automatically translate into political stability.
The central question is therefore what comes after Macron. His constitutional term limit means that he cannot simply continue indefinitely, and the 2027 presidential election will determine a new direction for the country. The crucial issue, however, is whether France merely replaces one political establishment with another or whether the next generation of leadership addresses the deeper causes of political and economic discontent.
Another president cannot simply inherit France’s enormous debt and expect the problem to disappear. Another prime minister cannot indefinitely operate as a substitute for parliamentary consensus. Another reshuffle cannot resolve the underlying crisis of representation. And another grand geopolitical declaration cannot compensate for domestic economic weakness.
France needs political renewal capable of reconciling fiscal responsibility with social protection, national sovereignty with international engagement, and cultural continuity with the realities of a changing society. Above all, it needs institutions that citizens believe are listening to them.
The remaining period of the Macron presidency will therefore be judged not merely by its diplomatic ambitions, but by the condition in which France is left: politically fragmented, heavily indebted, and searching for a new direction. The country entered the Macron era with serious structural problems. It now approaches the post-Macron era with those problems still unresolved — and with a substantially greater public debt burden.
Lee Jay Walker – pointedly says – “The 2027 election may therefore represent a major political turning point. But changing the occupant of the Élysée Palace will not, by itself, restore France’s confidence. The next chapter will depend upon whether French political leaders can address the underlying questions of debt, economic opportunity, immigration, social cohesion, national identity, parliamentary representation, and France’s role in an increasingly dangerous international environment.”
The fundamental issue is ultimately one of power and accountability. When power becomes concentrated but political responsibility becomes fragmented, citizens can lose faith in the institutions that govern them. France’s challenge is to reverse that dynamic before political theatre becomes a permanent substitute for effective government.
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