Saudi Arabia and Distrust of Iran despite Diplomacy being Espoused
Murad Makhmudov, Noriko Watanabe, and Lee Jay Walker
Modern Tokyo Times
Saudi Arabia has hardened its rhetoric toward Iran while continuing to urge both Washington and Tehran to pursue diplomacy. Riyadh’s position reflects a difficult strategic calculation: Saudi Arabia wants to deter Iranian aggression and constrain Tehran’s regional network of armed partners, yet it has little interest in seeing the Gulf transformed into the front line of a direct American-Iranian war.
In March, Saudi Arabia warned that it “reserves the right” to respond to any Iranian military threat, including ballistic missiles, drones, or attacks conducted through regional proxies. The language marked a firmer deterrent posture. Yet deterrence, from Riyadh’s perspective, is intended to prevent escalation rather than invite it.
Like Israel, Saudi Arabia regards Iran’s regional network of armed proxies as a major security concern, particularly the Houthi movement in Yemen. Riyadh has also cooperated with Washington in military action against Iran-backed militias in Iraq. The BBC reported that “Saudi Arabia and the US have carried out strikes against Iran-backed militias in Iraq, in a potential escalation of the Middle East conflict.”
Such developments underline the increasingly interconnected nature of the regional confrontation, in which pressure on Iran can rapidly extend from the Levant and Iraq to the Gulf and Red Sea.
According to US Central Command (CENTCOM), strikes in early August targeted “Iran-aligned terrorists that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) directed to attack US forces and Saudi energy infrastructure.” The operation focused on positions associated with Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), highlighting Riyadh’s willingness to confront Iranian-aligned forces while still seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with Tehran itself.
This distinction is fundamental to understanding the Saudi position. Riyadh is prepared to strengthen deterrence, deepen security cooperation with Washington and its Gulf partners, and respond to attacks on Saudi territory or infrastructure. At the same time, Saudi leaders have repeatedly stressed that escalation is not their objective. Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, spokesperson for the Saudi Defense Ministry, stated: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reiterates that it does not seek escalation but will respond decisively to any aggression directed against it.”
The wider Gulf is similarly uneasy. The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—face the prospect that an expanding confrontation between Iran and the United States could rapidly threaten their populations, energy infrastructure, ports and maritime trade. Following earlier American and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets, the bloc pledged to “take all necessary measures” to protect its territories, populations and critical infrastructure, while simultaneously keeping the door open to diplomacy.
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has nevertheless signaled that Riyadh’s patience has limits, warning: “This pressure from Iran will backfire politically and morally… and certainly we reserve the right to take military actions if deemed necessary.” The message is therefore one of deterrence rather than indiscriminate confrontation: Saudi Arabia wants Tehran to understand that attacks against the Kingdom or its critical infrastructure could carry a direct cost.
Yemen remains particularly important to Saudi security calculations. The Houthi movement represents a uniquely sensitive threat because of Yemen’s geographical proximity to Saudi Arabia and the strategic importance of the Red Sea. The Guardian reported that the Iran-aligned Houthis, who control large parts of northern and western Yemen, declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and struck Saudi tankers in the Red Sea. Such developments demonstrate how Yemen can become a pressure point against Saudi economic and maritime interests far beyond the immediate battlefield.
Iran, however, continues to reject a military solution to Yemen and other regional disputes. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated: “We believe that there is no military solution to the issue of Yemen, Bab al-Mandab and other regional issues.” The contradiction is striking: while Tehran emphasizes diplomacy, the broader regional environment remains shaped by armed non-state actors, competing security doctrines and the strategic use of maritime chokepoints.
From Riyadh’s perspective, the Houthi question cannot be separated from the wider Iranian regional strategy. Tehran’s relationships with armed movements provide strategic depth and enable pressure to be exerted without necessarily committing Iran itself to direct interstate warfare. The Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea and the wider Gulf maritime network consequently become part of a much larger geopolitical contest over energy, trade and regional influence.
The BBC has captured the vulnerability facing Riyadh, noting that after Saudi Arabia reached an uneasy truce with the Houthis in 2022, the Kingdom is once again confronting the possibility of drone and missile attacks from Yemen while also facing threats from Iran-aligned forces to its north. Saudi Arabia therefore finds itself surrounded by interconnected theatres of instability, even as it seeks to consolidate its economy and pursue its broader national transformation agenda.
This explains an important paradox in Saudi foreign policy. Riyadh is simultaneously strengthening deterrence against Iran and advocating diplomacy between Washington and Tehran. Saudi Arabia has reportedly urged the United States to avoid an open-ended bombing campaign against Iran and instead pursue a negotiated resolution to the crisis. This is not necessarily a sign of Saudi softness toward Tehran. Rather, it reflects a hard geopolitical calculation: an extended US-Iranian war could expose Saudi territory, energy infrastructure, shipping routes and economic ambitions to enormous risks.
For Riyadh, therefore, the objective is not to choose between deterrence and diplomacy. It is to use deterrence to create the conditions in which diplomacy remains possible.
Saudi Arabia wants Iran’s regional influence constrained, Iranian-backed attacks deterred, the security relationship with the United States preserved, and the GCC protected. But it also understands that a direct Saudi-Iranian war could become extraordinarily destructive, destabilizing the Gulf and threatening the economic foundations upon which Saudi Arabia’s future ambitions depend.
The geopolitical balance is consequently delicate. Riyadh is strengthening its military deterrence, expanding cooperation with Washington and fellow GCC states, and confronting Iranian-aligned proxies where necessary. Yet at the same time, Saudi Arabia is attempting to prevent the United States and Iran from crossing a threshold from confrontation into prolonged regional war.
This may ultimately prove to be Riyadh’s greatest diplomatic challenge. Saudi Arabia wants Iran contained—but not at the price of the Gulf being consumed by war. It wants American protection—but not an American campaign that turns Saudi territory and energy infrastructure into Iranian targets. And it wants stronger regional security—while keeping sufficient diplomatic space open to prevent miscalculation.
As tensions intensify, that space is becoming increasingly narrow. The greatest danger for Saudi Arabia may therefore not be a deliberate decision by Riyadh or Tehran to begin a wider war, but an attack, retaliation or miscalculation that removes the remaining barriers to one.
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